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Abstract. There has long been a need for a simulation environment
rich enough to support the development of an AI system sufficiently
knowledgeable about physical causality to pass certain tests of Psy-
chometric Artificial Intelligence (PAI) and Psychometric Artificial
General Intelligence (PAGI). In this article, we present a simulation
environment, PAGI World, which is: cross-platform (as it can be run
on all major operating systems); open-source (and thus completely
free of charge to use); able to work with AI systems written in al-
most any programming language; as agnostic as possible regarding
which AI approach is used; and easy to set up and get started with.
It is our hope that PAGI World will give rise to AI systems that de-
velop truly rich knowledge and representation about how to interact
with the world, and will allow AI researchers to test their already-
developed systems without the additional overhead of developing a
simulation environment of their own. After clarifying both PAI and
PAGI, we summarize arguments that there is great need for a simu-
lation environment like PAGI World. We present multiple examples
of already-available PAI and PAGI tasks in PAGI World, covering a
wide range of research areas of interest to the general-purpose AI
community.
1 Introduction
Toward the end of his long and extremely distinguished career, Jean
Piaget began to name and concretely describe some mechanisms he
believed were responsible for the emergence of many features of ma-
ture cognition: formal reasoning, an understanding of causality, and
analogical ability were among these features, along with many oth-
ers [26, 25, 28]. Piaget had long suspected that these features and
the concepts they relied on were constructed by the child using sim-
pler schemas acquired through interaction with the physical world,
at least since (Piaget and Inhelder 1958). Thus the role that the world
plays in shaping the constructs and abilities of the child, which in-
forms the related question of how much AI can progress without
having a real-world-like environment, has been a cornerstone issue
in AI for some time now [10, 11, 18].
But modeling these Piagetian beliefs is, to this day, an unmet
goal that has existed at least since (Drescher 1991). Such model-
ing is a dream of computational cognitive modelers, but, perhaps
more specifically, is a goal of the field of developmental AI. This is
the field which attempts to show how, using an agent endowed with
minimal innate capacities embedded in a sufficiently rich environ-
ment, higher-level cognitive abilities can emerge [17]. These abili-
ties may include logico-mathematical reasoning, an understanding of
causality, robust analogical reasoning, and others. Furthermore, work
in developmental AI systems strives to show that the emergence of
such abilities could be reflective of the way they develop in humans,
whether this is in the pattern predicted by Piaget’s stage theories or
not.
This paper describes a task-centered, physically realistic simula-
tion environment that we have developed to simultaneously address
a set of challenges in evaluating AGIs. We motivate PAGI World in
Section 2, introduce PAGI World in Section 3, and outline examples
of a wide variety of tasks in PAGI World in Section 4.
2 Motivations
Here we summarize three categories of motivations for PAGI World,
particularly of interest to those wishing to evaluate artificially-
general intelligence (AGI). C1 - C6 specify conditions for a suffi-
ciently rich simulation environment. The Tailorability Concern (Sec-
tion 2.2) deals with the way in which an AGI acquires and constructs
its knowledge. Finally, Section 2.3 puts forth our belief that an AGI’s
knowledge should be expressive, in the sense of logical expressivity.
2.1 Guerin’s Conditions
Frank Guerin [17], in his recent survey of the developmental AI field,
concluded that current systems were lacking in several key areas.
Guerin then suggested that a major reason (arguably the most impor-
tant reason) why the field has the shortcomings he described, is the
absence of a suitable simulation environment. Current simulation en-
vironments used by developmental-AI projects were missing several
key features, and Guerin described some conditions that would need
to be met by simulation environments in order to address this prob-
lem. We refer to the most important of these conditions as C1, C2,
and C3. A sufficiently rich simulation environment for developmen-
tal AI should, at a minimum:
C1 be rich enough to provide knowledge that would bootstrap under-
standing of concepts rooted in physical relationships; e.g.: inside
vs. outside, large vs. strong, etc.
C2 allow for the modeling and acquisition of spatial knowledge,
which Guerin notes is widely regarded to be a foundational
domain of knowledge acquisition, through interaction with the
world.
C3 support the creation and maintenance of knowledge the agent can
verify itself.
[21] introduced a few additional conditions:
C4 be rich enough to provide much of the sensory-level information
that an agent in the real world would have access to.
C5 allow for testing of a virtually unlimited variety of tasks, whether
these are tasks testing low-level implicit knowledge, high-level ex-
plicit knowledge, or any of the other areas required by Psychome-
tric Artificial General Intelligence (PAGI). Ideally, such a system
would support the easy creation of new tasks and environments
without requiring a massive programming effort.
C6 provide pragmatic features enabling tasks to be attempted by re-
searchers using different types of systems and different theoretical
approaches, thus enabling these different approaches to be directly
compared with each other.
These conditions were elaborated on and defended in [21], so we will
not do so here. A common theme running through all six conditions
is that what is lacking from current microworlds is a physically real-
istic environment—one in which the agent can acquire, develop, and
test its concepts. But the concerns raised by Guerin are not only of in-
terest to the field of Developmental AI; in point of fact, all of AI can
benefit by addressing them. For example, C1 is extremely important
for cognitive models of analogy, as they struggle to overcome what
has been called the Tailorability Concern (TC)[16, 22].
2.2 The Tailorability Concern
TC, in essence, is the concern that models of analogy (though this can
be applied to all cognitive architectures in general) work almost ex-
clusively with manually constructed knowledge representations, us-
ing toy examples often tailor-made to display some limited-scope
ability. Licato et al. ([22]) argue that overcoming TC is necessary to
advance the fields of analogy and cognitive architectures, by devel-
oping a set of conditions that must be met in order to claim victory
over TC:
TCA3 A computational system of analogy answers TC if
and only if given no more than either
• unstructured textual and/or visual data, or
• a large, pre-existing database,
and minimal input, it is able to consistently produce use-
ful analogies and demonstrate stability through a variety
of input forms and domains.
According to TCA3, then, good performance on the part of a
cognitive agent on a sufficiently large knowledge-base from which
source analogs could be drawn is required to answer TC. An agent
interacting in the sort of microworld called for by Guerin might ide-
ally be able to acquire such source analogs by simply interacting with
its environment.
C1 and TC together require that the microworld itself is what pro-
vides the knowledge drawn upon to construct concepts of basic phys-
ical relationships, not manually constructed source analogs or fully
explicit logical theories. C2 expands on C1 by requiring that this
knowledge of physical relationships not be static, but rather should
allow for an agent in the world to learn through interaction. The idea
that children learn by initiating interactions with the world based on
their (often incomplete) conceptions of reality—in a manner that re-
sembles scientific experimentation—was championed by Piaget and
later, Piaget-influenced work [2, 29, 27, 39].
Following TCA3, another formulation of the Tailorability Concern
and recommendation for how to surpass it was also presented in [22]:
TCA4 A computational system A for analogy generation
answers TC if and only if, given as input no more than
either
• unstructured textual and/or visual data, or
• a vast, pre-existing database not significantly pre-
engineered ahead of time by humans for any particular
tests of A ,
is—in keeping with aforementioned Psychometric AI—
able to consistently generate analogies that enable A to
perform provably well on precisely defined tests of cog-
nitive ability and skill.
TCA4 ties TC to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) by introduc-
ing the concept of Psychometric AI (PAI) [3, 9]. PAI sees good per-
formance on well-established tests of intelligence as a solid indicator
of progress in AI. Some may note that most intelligence tests fail to
capture human-level skills such as creativity and real-time problem
solving; therefore, related to PAI is Psychometric Artificial General
Intelligence (PAGI) [6]. For example, one test of PAGI is Bringsjord
and Licato’s (2012) Piaget-MacGyver Room, in which an agent is in-
side a room with certain items and a task to be performed. The agent
must achieve the task using some combination of the items in the
room (or using none of them, if possible). Depending on the task, the
solutions may require using the items in unusual ways, as viewers of
the MacGyver television series may remember. We describe several
example Piaget-MacGyver Rooms in PAGI World in Section 4.1
2.3 Expressivity
Even after satisfying TC, it would be difficult to claim an AGI is truly
general-intelligent unless its knowledge satisfies a certain degree of
logical expressivity. By this, we do not mean that an AGI must pos-
sess a Go¨del-like mastery of formal logic. Rather, the term refers
to the well-established hierarchy of expressivity in formal theories.
For example, a formal theory equivalent in expressivity to first-order
logic (FOL) can express anything that one equivalent to propositional
calculus (PC) can express. The converse is not true; something like
“all men are mortal” simply cannot be expressed in a quantifier-free
logic like PC, since the ability to take any possible man m and apply
the statement “all men are mortal” to deduce that m is mortal is only
possible with machinery that treats quantified variables as variables
that can be quantified over.
Logical expressivity, then, is a real restriction on any formal the-
ory’s ability to express properties.2 But the use of terminology from
mathematical logic should not obscure the more general fact that log-
ical expressivity is really a restriction on any system whatsoever that
1 Note that although we have adopted “PAGI World” as the name of our sim-
ulation environment in order to reflect the fact that it is designed to sup-
port many types of PAGI tests (including variants of the Piaget-MacGyver
Room, as we describe below), PAI tests are just as easily implementable in
PAGI World.
2 See [33] for a good initial definition of what it means to express properties
in formal theories.
can be described using rules for producing new behaviors, actions,
knowledge, or structures. All AI systems in history are no exception;
once we formally describe the set of rules that govern that AI system,
those rules fall under some level of logical expressivity, and whatever
that level is limits what that system can ultimately do.
Furthermore, FOL’s expressivity is not enough for general intel-
ligence. Humans routinely reason over sets, analogies, the beliefs,
desires, and intentions of others, and so on. Such concepts require
logics significantly more expressive than FOL: second-order logic,
epistemic/modal logics, even third-order logic in some cases [7]. If
an AGI is to truly be as general-purpose a reasoner as the typical
human, a high level of expressivity is needed.
For the first time, we present here a conjecture3 encapsulating this
view:
AGI>FOL. No system can claim to be an AGI unless
its knowledge is at least more logically expressive than
first-order logic.
A very high-level proof sketch of the above is as follows:
1. a concept C is accurately captured in a system S only if that sys-
tem can, at a minimum, produce any actions, inferences, behav-
iors, or knowledge structures that would be expected of a system
capturing C .
2. A system cannot thus fully capture a concept C if its knowledge
representation is below the level of logical expressivity required
for C .
3. There are many concepts required for AGI which are at a level of
logical expressivity higher than FOL.
4. Thus, no artificial system with an expressivity at the level of FOL
or lower can be an AGI.
We omit many details here, but the argument presented is at the core
of a more encompassing argument for expressivity in AGI systems,
currently under development. For our present purposes, suffice it to
say that simulation environments which restrict the expressivity level
of the knowledge of the agents which can use the environments to, or
below that of FOL, can not hope to see the creation of fully general
intelligence. PAGI World avoids that by placing no restrictions on the
form of knowledge used by its artificial agents.
3 Introducing PAGI World
Condition C6 is the most practicality-oriented, reflecting both
Guerin’s (2011) and our own inclination to believe that an effective
way to compare AI and AGI methodologies would be to see how they
perform on the same tasks, implemented on the same systems. But
few such tasks and systems exist, and therefore before we describe
PAGI World, it may be helpful to take a step back and look at our
project in a broader view.
3.1 Why Isn’t Such a System Already Available?
Given its potential benefit to the field as a whole, why does such an
environment not currently exist, and do any of the roadblocks cur-
rently in the way affect the plausibility of our current project?
3 The authors believe strongly in the truth of AGI>FOL, and ultimately hope
to elevate it to the status of a theorem. However, as the present paper’s scope
permits only a loose proof sketch, we present it here as merely a conjecture.
3.1.1 Technical Hurdles
One potential roadblock is obvious: programming a realistic physics
simulation is hard. Some of this difficulty is reduced by working
with a 2D, rather than a 3D, environment. Although some software
libraries have previously been available for 2D physics simulations,
they have often been very language-specific and somewhat difficult
to configure.
Secondly, even if one were to stick with a 2D physics library and
commit to it, substantial development resources would be needed to
enable the resulting simulation to run on more than one major op-
erating system. Furthermore, even if that problem is somehow ad-
dressed, there is a vast diversity of languages that AI researchers pre-
fer to use: Python, LISP (in various dialects, each with their own
passionate proponents), C++, etc. All of these technical issues tend
to reduce how willing researchers are to adopt particular simulation
environments.
Fortunately, all of the above problems can be solved with a single
design choice. Unity, a free game-development engine, has recently
released a 2D feature set,4 which comes with a 2D physics model
that is extremely easy to work with. Furthermore, Unity allows for
simultaneous compilation to all major operating systems, so that de-
velopers only have to write one version of the program, and it is triv-
ial to release versions for Mac OS, Windows, and Linux. Because
Unity produces self-contained executables, very little to no setup is
required by the end users.
Finally, because Unity allows scripting in C#, we were able to
write an interface for AI systems that communicates with PAGI
World through TCP/IP sockets. This means that AI scripts can be
written in virtually any programming language, so long as the lan-
guage supports port communication.
3.1.2 Theoretical Hurdles
Unity conveniently helps to remove many of the technical roadblocks
that have previously blocked the development of simulation envi-
ronments that can be widely adopted. But there are also theoreti-
cal roadblocks; these are problems pertaining to the generality vs.
work-required tradeoff. For example, if a simulation environment is
too specifically tailored to a certain task, then not only can systems
eventually be written to achieve that particular task and nothing else,
but the simulation environment quickly becomes less useful once the
task is solved. On the other hand, if the system is too general (e.g. if a
researcher decides to start from scratch with nothing but Unity), then
the researcher must devote too much time and energy to developing
a new simulation environment for each project, rather than spending
time on the AI itself.
PAGI World was designed with this tradeoff in mind. A task in
PAGI World might be thought of as a Piaget-MacGyver Room with
a configuration of objects. Users can, at run-time, open an object
menu (Figure 1) and select from a variety of pre-defined world ob-
jects, such as walls made of different materials (and thus different
weights, temperatures, and friction coefficients), smaller objects like
food or poisonous items, functional items like buttons, water dis-
pensers, switches, and more. The list of available world objects will
frequently be expanding and new world objects will be importable
into tasks without having to recreate tasks with each update. Per-
haps most importantly, tasks can be saved and loaded, so that as new
PAI/PAGI experiments are designed, new tasks can be created by
4 In fact, the blog post making the announcement of the 2D feature set was
dated November 12, 2013.
anyone. Section 4 illustrates the wide variety of tasks that can be
created with such a system.
Figure 1: PAGI World With the Object Menu Visible
3.1.3 Other Simulation Environments
There have been some notable attempts to provide simulation
environments for AI systems, particularly those inspired by the
Developmental-AI approach. For example, in [12] Bruce created a
Developmental-AI testbed by updating an older version created by
Frank Guerin.
Although some of the present paper’s authors are sympathetic to
the power of Piagetian schemas and the AI systems derived from
Piaget’s theories, Bruce’s system is tightly coupled with a partic-
ular cognitive architecture (presented in the same paper) that uses
schema-based AI systems, whereas PAGI World, as we have said, is
agnostic about what AI approach is used. It is unclear how easy or
difficult it would be to adapt arbitrary cognitive architectures to work
with their simulation environment.
They used the JBox2D library for their physics engine, which, ac-
cording to [12], was poorly documented and difficult to work with
(e.g., implementing a method to detect when the robot hand touched
an object took markedly longer than they planned due to a lack of
documentation for JBox2D). Although a newer version of JBox2D
became available afterwards, implementing the new version requires
the simulation programmer to manually update the relevant code,
whereas updates to the Unity 2D physics engine automatically prop-
agate to PAGI World, without any code changes on our part.
3.1.4 Drescher’s Simulation
In [14], Drescher proposes an early microworld in which an agent,
making use of a primitive form of Piagetian schemas, explores the
world and learned about the objects with which it interacted. Al-
though this was a promising start, after its initial success it was not
developed further, nor was any significant effort made by other re-
searchers to pick up on Drescher’s work, as far as we are aware
(only one small-scale re-implementation of Drescher’s work exists,
e.g. [13]).
Drescher’s microworld consists of a 2D scene divided into a grid
that limits the granularity of all other elements in the microworld.
Inside this microworld are objects that take up discrete areas of the
grid and contain visual and tactile properties, in the form of numeri-
cal vectors with arbitrarily chosen values.
Most importantly, the microworld contains a single robot-like
agent with a single hand that can move in a 3-cell × 3-cell region
relative to the part of the robot’s body considered to be its “eye.” If
the hand object is adjacent to an object in the world (including the
robot’s own body), a four-dimensional vector containing tactile in-
formation is returned to the agent. The body has tactile sensors as
well, though they do not return tactile information as detailed as that
returned by the tactile sensors of the hand.
Visual information is available as well, in the form of a visual
field whose position is defined relative to the robot’s body. A smaller
region within the visual field, called the foveal region, represents the
area within the visual field where the robot is currently looking. The
foveal region returns vectors representing visual information, and the
cells in the visual field not in the foveal region also return visual
information, but with lower detail.
Perhaps one of the most interesting features of Drescher’s mi-
croworld is that the robot can only interact directly with the world
by sending a set of predefined “built-in actions.” Although the inter-
nal schema mechanism of the robot may learn to represent actions as
richer and more complicated, ultimately what is sent to the simula-
tion environment is always extremely low-level. Likewise, the infor-
mation provided to the robot is always extremely low-level. The task
of identifying and naming objects in the world—and even of know-
ing that objects in the world consistently exist!—is up to the learning
mechanism the robot utilizes.
The fact that the learning and control system of the artificial agent
can be developed almost completely independently of the features
of the world itself, is one of the primary reasons why Drescher’s
microworld is appealing, and was selected as a starting point for
PAGI World. PAGI World departs from, and has innovated beyond,
Drescher’s microworld in several key areas:
• Agnosticism re. the AI method used. Whereas Drescher’s mi-
croworld was created for the sole purpose of testing his Piagetian
schema-learning mechanism, we have designed the world, pro-
gram, and interfaces so that as wide a variety as possible of AI
techniques can be productively and easily used.
• Optional mid-level input. Related to the previous point, we re-
alize that some researchers simply won’t want to translate vector
input for every piece of tactile or visual information they come
across, and so we offer the option for the agent to directly receive
the name of the object upon touching or viewing it.
• Granularity. The granularity of our world is dramatically finer;
consider the increase in size of the visual field: Drescher’s was
an area of 7-×-7 cells with one visual sensor per cell. We have
improved the visual area to span a 450-×-300 unit area, with each
visual sensor spaced 15 units from its nearest neighbor (each unit
roughly corresponds to a screen pixel).
• Vision system. In addition to having a wider visual field, ours
has no foveal region, because the tasks we design require a visual
field large enough to observe multiple objects at once. Certainly it
is plausible that rapid eye movements can account for this ability
in human beings, but our initial investigations found it to have too
little theoretical benefit compared to how difficult it made working
with the system.
• Hands. We have given the robot two hands instead of one, each
with a similar range of motion, but with different distances (rel-
ative to the body) that each can reach. Although the simulation
world is 2D, the hands exist on a separate layer that floats “above”
objects in the world, analogously to a mouse cursor in any ma-
jor operating system. The hands can grip and move objects they
are floating over (just as one might click and drag an object in
Windows or MacOS), provided the objects are not too heavy or
otherwise held down.
• Realistic Physics. Certainly a very important improvement we in-
troduce is the aforementioned realistic physics provided by Unity
2D.
• Focus on a wide breadth of tasks. Although Drescher’s mi-
croworld was a start in the right direction, we feel that it did not
quite make enough of a push to be considered a simulation envi-
ronment for AGI tasks, nor did it explicitly set out to be a testbed
for the sort of tasks prescribed by Psychometric AI.
3.2 The Architecture of a PAGI World Setup
Figure 2 pictures the architecture of a typical PAGI World + AI con-
troller pairing. As the figure illustrates, it is helpful to think of the
processes controlled by the PAGI-World application to be the PAGI
side, as opposed to the side which can be completely implemented
externally, referred to as the AI side. The reflex and state machine
described in Section 3.3 is controlled and managed on the PAGI side,
but both states and reflexes can be dynamically modified through
commands sent by the AI side.
All commands going from the AI side to the PAGI side, and all
sensory information passing in the other direction, is passed via mes-
sages communicated through TCP/IP ports. Therefore, the AI-side
can be written in any programming language that supports the cre-
ation, and decoding, of strings over TCP/IP. Although this flexibility
sets PAGI World apart from many other alternatives, some may prefer
an additional level of abstraction on the AI side, and for this reason
we provide, and are continuing development on, a Python API called
pyPAGI.
Tasks can be created, saved, and loaded using the GUI editor at
run-time (Figure 1), but as suggested by Figure 2, they can also be
somewhat configured by AI-side commands. This can be useful to
modify the layout of the task dynamically in response to actions the
AI agent takes (e.g., making an apple appear as a reward, or a bottle
of poison as a punishment), or to load new tasks after successful task
completion for automated batch processing of tasks.
3.3 Reflexes, DFAs, and the Implicit vs. Explicit
Distinction
Although communication through TCP/IP ports is relatively quick,
and the command system we have created is designed to be efficient,
there are some actions that require extremely rapid, simple checks
and responses. For example, holding an object in the air at a certain
position relative to the body for an extended period of time may re-
quire many quick corrections. If the object starts to move down, more
upward force should be applied. But if it moves too far up, downward
force should be applied (or the amount of upward force should be re-
duced). In order to hold the object as still as possible, the amount
of force applied would be based on its current and projected veloc-
ity and position. However, if the AI script requests this information,
does a calculation to determine the amount of correction required,
and sends back the command to adjust the amount of force, by the
time this command is received by PAGI World and processed it may
be inaccurate.
PAGI World fixes this problem by implementing states and re-
flexes. Reflexes and states can be set and modified through commands
from the AI script, but they are actually checked and executed com-
pletely on the PAGI-World side, which allows for much faster reac-
tion times. A reflex r consists of a tuple (C,A), where C is a list of
conditions and A is a list of actions. Each condition in C must be
satisfied in order for reflex r to activate. These conditions can con-
sist of sensory inequalities, for example: whether one of the tactile
sensors detects a temperature above a certain amount, or whether
the AI agent’s body is moving above a certain velocity. If all of the
conditions are met, then the actions are executed immediately. Fur-
thermore, sensory inequalities can be specified as simple arithmetic
functions of sensory values, so that a reflex can be fired if (to cite an
arbitrary example) the horizontal component of the agent’s body’s
velocity is at least twice the value of the vertical component of its
velocity.
States can be activated and checked by reflexes. Essentially, this
means that multiple deterministic finite automata (DFAs) can be
stored and executed completely on the PAGI side. However, the ex-
pressivity of the conditions and actions within each reflex strictly
restricts the system so that full Turing machines cannot be imple-
mented on the PAGI side. This allows developers to implement two
important categories of abilities generally regarded to be part of the
human experience: explicit, and implicit. Recall that the explicit vs.
implicit distinction divides the mind into explicit processes which are
generally slow, deliberate, and easy to verbalize, versus implicit pro-
cesses which are mostly quick, automatic, and not easily accessible
to the conscious mind [35].
The implicit/explicit distinction [35], which roughly parallels the
System 1/System 2 distinction of Kahneman [20] (but see [37] for a
criticism of System 1 vs. 2), encompasses an extremely broad spec-
trum of explanations for human phenomena [34, 35, 36]. If a simula-
tion environment restricts itself to AI controllers that rely on explicit
or implicit processes exclusively, then it cannot hope to capture the
breadth of tasks required to qualify a Psychometric Artificial General
Intelligence. If PAGI tasks are meant to subsume all tasks solvable
by neurobiologically normal human adults, then a simulation envi-
ronment designed to capture PAGI tasks should also be able to test
AI agents on their use of both explicit and implicit knowledge.
Although the PAGI side does not support all imaginable implicit
processes (for example, some might believe that a Bayesian proba-
bilistic approach or a Deep Neural Network is necessary to imple-
ment some implicit processes), the fact that multiple DFAs can be
stored and executed in PAGI World’s optimized code gives the user
flexibility to capture a wide range of implicit processes. Furthermore,
in keeping with the design principles of PAGI World, AI systems
built on implicit processes can still be implemented fully on the AI
side.
4 Some Example Tasks
We have designed some tasks to demonstrate the range of possibili-
ties and showcase some of PAGI World’s unique features.
4.1 Piaget-MacGyver Rooms
4.1.1 The Water Diversion Piaget-MacGyver Room
A prime example of a typical MacGyver task comes from Season 2,
Episode 5 of the MacGyver television series. Angus MacGyver, the
series’ titular character, found a friend of his being threatened by a
mountain lion. MacGyver, positioned at a ledge above both his friend
and the mountain lion, reconfigured some rocks and a log so that he
could guide a nearby stream of water in such a way that it created
a small waterfall separating his friend and the mountain lion. The
mountain lion ran away immediately.
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Figure 2: The architecture of an instance of PAGI World and an AI con-
troller. Everything on the AI side can be written by AI researchers, as the in-
terface with the PAGI side is handled through messages passed over TCP/IP
sockets. A Python library, called pyPAGI, is also optionally available to assist
researchers with common AI-side functionality, including encoding of PAGI-
World knowledge in the Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus (DCEC ∗). The
reflex/state machine and task editors can also be controlled through TCP/IP,
though the task editor is additionally available through a WYSIWYG drag-
and-drop interface.
Figure 3: A sample Piaget-MacGyver Room in which the agent is expected
to direct the flow of water in order to reach an apple.
Of course, other solutions may have been available. Perhaps Mac-
Gyver could have simply thrown rocks at the mountain lion, or fash-
ioned a bow and arrow out of twigs, sharpened stones, and parts of
his knapsack. But these different solutions would have come with
their own unique advantages and disadvantages, and furthermore, to
not lose sight of the PAGI-oriented question: Could an artificially in-
telligent agent figure out any of these solutions without having been
specifically trained for that particular solution? PAGI problems such
as the Piaget-MacGyver room challenge researchers to find answers
to this question.
The ability to direct the flow of water opens up a wide range of
tasks, which we can model in PAGI World. Using the Fluvio li-
brary for fluid dynamics, PAGI World can generate fluid-like par-
ticles. These particles have several realistic properties of fluids; for
example, when poured into a cup-like container, an object placed in
the filled container will either float or sink depending on its weight.
The task in Figure 3 has water flowing down a system of angled
brick walls. The bottom angled wall can be moved around a pivot
in its center, so that the flow of water can be directed to the left or
right. If it is directed to the right, the water will flow further down
until it encounters an orange block. If the orange block is moved, the
water will eventually flow into a pit which contains an apple, which
the agent could previously see but not reach. The flow of water will
eventually fill up the pit, causing the apple to float up to where the
agent can reach it.
4.1.2 The Piagetian Balance-Beam Task
Some tasks that might be considered Piaget-MacGyver Rooms can
come directly from classical Piagetian experiments. Inhelder and
Piaget’s (1958) Balance-Beam Task (BBT) [19] has been modeled
many times using a variety of modeling techniques [41, 30, 32, 31,
38, 23]. In the BBT, a balancing beam with a set of weights are pro-
vided to a subject. The balancing beam has notches, hooks, or some
other apparatus that allows the weights to be placed on the left or
right sides of the balancing beam at predefined intervals. In most
versions of the task, the values of the weights and the distances that
the locations are from the center are made available to the subject.
The task is normally to figure out some version of the torque rule,
which relates the product of the value of a weight and its distance
from the center. For example, the subject may be presented with a
configuration of weights on the scale, and the subject is asked to pre-
dict whether the right or left side will tilt downwards or the scale will
balance.
Figure 4: The Piagetian Balance Beam Task in PAGI World
We recreate the BBT in PAGI World as in Figure 4. A balance
beam with several hooks on which weights can be hung is in the
center of the screen. There is also a switch (on the bottom right side
of the screen) that can be used to toggle the motion of the balance
beam. That way, the weights can be hung on the balance beam and the
beam will not move while the agent is reasoning about how the beam
should tilt when the switch is toggled. This BBT is fully implemented
and included in PAGI World (although no AI capable of solving this
task has yet been developed).
One clear limitation of computationally modeling most Piagetian
tasks is that you can’t really communicate with the AI agent in natu-
ral language like you can with the children in Piagetian experiments.
Although the current state of the art in natural-language processing
and generation prohibits such communication at present, PAGI World
offers tools to make it easier for researchers who are trying to achieve
this benchmark. There is a way to “talk to” the AI agent through an
input text box in PAGI World itself. Having the agent talk back, how-
ever, can be handled in three possible ways: through simple output
handled completely by the code on the AI side, by sending a message
to PAGI World that can be displayed in an output window (a console
screen accessible through PAGI World), or by creating a speech bub-
ble.
Speech bubbles can be created (Figure 5) by AI-side scripts. These
speech bubbles are recognizable by PAGI guy’s vision system, along
with data such as the name of the speaker, the location of the box,
the text written inside of it, and so on.
Figure 5: Speech bubbles can be created to simulate conversations, giving
them a visual element that makes for understandable demonstrations.
4.2 Moral Reasoning
4.2.1 Resolving a Moral Dilemma
One interesting and possibly fertile source of PAGI-World tasks is
the area of morality, specifically machine ethics [40], which is de-
voted to trying to engineer machines that have at least a degree of
moral sensibility. Figure 6 depicts an example task in which two in-
jured soldiers are equally distant from PAGI guy, and only a single
health kit is available. PAGI World allows the visual sensors to detect
whether a soldier is injured or healthy. If a health kit touches an in-
jured soldier, the soldier will become healthy and the health kit will
disappear.
Some might recognize this task as a variant of the Buridan’s Don-
key scenario, where a donkey unable to choose between two bales
of hay, paralyzed by indecision, ends up starving to death. This task
can be used, for example, to evaluate whether a reasoning system
is sufficiently intelligent to avoid certain paralyzing situations, or to
search for creative solutions where they exist. PAGI World provides
two health kits: a small one, and a large one. The large health pack (as
in Figure 6) can be broken in half, when enough force is applied to
it, and each half can be given to one of the soldiers. We recently used
this task to demonstrate that the search for creative solutions, and the
ultimate decision to let one soldier remain injured if such a solution
can not be found, can be carried out entirely within the framework
provided by the Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus [5].
Figure 6: A task where an agent only has one health kit but two injured sol-
diers.
4.2.2 Reasoning Over Obligations to Detect Hijacking
Bello et al. in [1], use PAGI World to model a situation in which
a robot capable of autonomously reasoning over moral obligations
(represented by PAGI guy) is maliciously attacked and infected with
a virus. The virus hijacks the robot’s actuators, instructing them to
perform the action of pushing a healthy soldier over a ledge, resulting
into the soldier’s falling into a lava pit below. By using the reason-
ing mechanisms provided by the Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus,
Bello et al. are able to show that the robot can reason over its obli-
gations and its apparent desire to perform the harmful action to the
soldier, ultimately concluding that such an action is not morally per-
missible. Presumably, further reasoning might hypothesize the exis-
tence of the hijacking virus.
4.3 Low-Level Reasoning
4.3.1 Learning to Catch and to Avoid Painful Objects
The reflex and state system (Section 3.3) allows for reflexes to be
created and configured from the AI side and stored on the PAGI side,
where they can be activated automatically based on sensory values.
Whenever such a reflex is activated, a message can optionally be sent
to the AI side, naming the reflex which was just fired. This can allow
for after-the-fact reasoning of automatic reflexes. In one example, a
set of reflexes are configured so that the agent will quickly retract its
hand after touching a hot object (temperature sensors are among the
sensors lining the circumference of both hands). If the agent touches
an object with a high temperature (the flames and the hot plates, in
this example), the reflex will first fire and then the AI side can decide
if further actions should be taken, for example by looking at the ob-
ject which caused the reflex to fire, thus giving the agent a motivation
to avoid going near hot objects in the future.
PAGI World also allows for objects in the simulation to have an
objective utility value. These are called endorphins; objects with a
positive endorphin value are those that the AI agent may want to pur-
sue (e.g. food items), whereas negative endorphin values are those
the agent should avoid. Most objects in PAGI World have an endor-
phin value of zero, and PAGI World itself does not ensure that certain
endorphin-seeking behaviors are implemented by the agent.
Another example of the reflex system is catching an object. In the
baseball-catching task (available online), a baseball is launched to
soar right above the agent’s head, and he has a time period of a little
over a second in which his hands can reach the ball without moving
his body. Of course, the agent can optionally move his body as well
to reach for the ball if necessary. If the ball is caught, the agent will
receive an endorphin bonus; otherwise, the ball will fall off of the
ledge and no longer be accessible to the agent. Although TCP/IP
communication is relatively quick, the microsecond timing required
to estimate the speed and trajectory of the ball and move the hand in
time to catch it is not easily (and probably not possibly) done with
controls firmly on the AI side. Instead, reflexes must be used.
In addition to sensor values, reflexes can be configured to activate,
deactivate, or check for states, which are simply string labels config-
ured by the AI side. Because reflexes can optionally be set to fire only
if certain states are active, followed by deactivation of current states
and activation of new ones, reflexes can be used as transitions be-
tween states in a deterministic finite-automata machine. In addition
to receiving notifications whenever such a reflex fires, the AI-side
can poll the PAGI side to see which states and reflexes are currently
active, so that it can change them if necessary.
4.4 High-Level Reasoning
4.4.1 Self-Awareness: Reasoning About the Self
Whether artificial agents can ever have self-awareness is a highly
controversial topic; this is clear from the public discussion sur-
rounding popular press reporting a recent experiment in robot self-
awareness. Bringsjord et al. (2015) started with a puzzle devised by
philosopher Luciano Floridi [15], in which three artificial agents, or
robots, are given either a “dumbing” pill or a placebo. The dumbing
pill disables their higher-level cognition (i.e. their ability to reason),
and is given to two of the three robots. All three robots are then asked
which pill they received. The two given the dumbing pill cannot rea-
son, and thus remain silent (note their silence is not by choice, but
because they fail to reason at all). The robot given the placebo ul-
timately concludes it cannot decide, whereupon it utters the phrase
“I don’t know.” However, upon hearing (and, importantly, feeling) it-
self utter the phrase, it now has a new piece of knowledge with which
to reason. Given this new piece of knowledge, along with an under-
standing of the rules of the current experiment (knowledge which is
also initially given to the other two robots), it can then conclude that
it was in fact, not given the dumbing pill.
PAGI World was used to create Floridi’s task [8]. We created a
task containing three agents5, and on the AI-side, the agents were
connected to an automated theorem prover reasoning in the Deontic
Cognitive Event Calculus [5]. This calculus is a knowledge represen-
tation framework capable of expressing de se beliefs, i.e. a specific
type of reasoning about the self [4]. Pills are given to each agent,
implemented as endorphin-producing items. Placebos produce nega-
tive endorphins, and the dumbing pills produce positive endorphins.
When a pill is absorbed by an agent, the endorphin value is sent to
the AI-side, where the agent’s reasoning system is either disabled or
left untouched.
The experiment can then proceed. Commands “spoken” to the
agents are typed in to a text box that PAGI World makes available
(strings entered into this box are sent as messages to the AI-side).
Statements the agents wish to output can be sent from the AI-side
to PAGI-side as a special type of command, where they will be dis-
played on a debug screen.
It is important to here introduce a disclaimer: we do not claim
such an experiment “proves” self-awareness in our artificial agent.
Rather, this is just another example of the psychometric philosophy
underlying PAGI World, according to which a series of psychometric
tests are proposed (in this case, the tests given by Floridi (2005)),
undertaken by AI researchers, and the cycle repeats. PAGI World
makes the creation of such tests easier.
4.4.2 Analogico-Deductive Reasoning
Because tasks can be created dynamically through special commands
sent from the AI-side, saved to file, and loaded, it is possible to train
PAGI guy on tasks, then change the task and see how the previ-
ous training transfers. Such a setup is ideal in the testing of transfer
learning, e.g. in instances of analogico-deductive reasoning (ADR).
In ADR, an agent uses analogical reasoning to generate a hypothesis
about some target domain (where the target domain is often unfa-
miliar in some way). The hypothesis is then subjected to deductive
reasoning, so that it can either be proven false, or possibly shown to
imply some method of experimental verification [23].
In [24], Marton et al. used PAGI World to demonstrate ADR in a
real-time task. The agent was given the ability to assess its surround-
ings, and to solve a source task. In the source task, PAGI guy had to
reach an apple by jumping over an obstacle (a raised brick). It was
then faced with a different task, in which the obstacle was instead a
5 The ability to create multiple agents in PAGI World is a beta feature that is
not available in the publicly available version. We expect this feature to be
ready soon.
gap in the ground. The AI-side was able to generate a hypothesis that
the solution used in the source task, to jump over the obstacle, would
work in the target task as well. It then carries out a proof using a de-
ductive reasoner, and upon receiving confirmation from the prover,
jumps over the gap to reach the apple. For more details, see [24].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The release of PAGI World is accompanied with a call to all AGI and
human-level-AI researchers to finally examine the strengths and lim-
its of their preferred approaches. PAGI World allows for researchers
to very easily create tasks and microworlds in a 2D world with re-
alistic physics, with no knowledge in how to program. PAGI World
can interact with AI agents that are written in virtually any program-
ming language, and the simulation can be run on any major oper-
ating system. We have very carefully designed PAGI World to have
an extremely low technical barrier, so that many researchers can find
common ground upon which to compare their different approaches.
PAGI World can also be used in educational applications. In the
Spring of 2015, the present authors taught a course at RPI, which
made use of PAGI World for homework assignments, projects, and to
give students hands-on experience in implementing AI and cognitive
modeling techniques. The experiment was quite a success, and we are
currently further exploring PAGI World’s possibilities for education.
The future of PAGI World is bright. We already have several AI
systems in progress whose goals are to solve already-finished PAGI
World tasks, and as development continues we hope to greatly in-
crease the number of tasks which are available and the sophistication
of the agents which solve those tasks. The library of future tasks, we
hope, will diversify and reflect the broad spectrum of tasks which
require human-like intelligence.
PAGI World downloads, documentation, example tasks, and
source code can be downloaded from the RAIR Lab website at
http://rair.cogsci.rpi.edu/projects/pagi-world.6
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